CVE-2026-106126: Tenable Identity Exposure

How to Detect It

Detection should combine Tenable tenant activity with telemetry from the PDCe. Review Tenable audit records for unusual access by low-privileged users, unexpected use of the Active Directory Events Listener, activity outside normal administrative windows, and changes in the tenant’s configuration or monitored-directory integrations. The supplied material does not identify a definitive Tenable-specific event ID or log field, so organizations should obtain the relevant audit schema from Tenable before treating any single event as conclusive.

On the PDCe, look for unusual child processes created by services or agent processes associated with the integration, particularly when those processes run as NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM. Review Windows Security process-creation events where command-line auditing is enabled, and use Sysmon Event ID 1 if Sysmon is deployed. Correlate process creation with logons, service changes, PowerShell execution, scheduled-task creation, and outbound connections.

Technical Notes

A generic Microsoft Sentinel or Kusto-style query can help identify suspicious SYSTEM process creation on the PDCe. Replace the host and process names with the actual names observed in the environment; the supplied sources do not identify the vulnerable listener’s local process name.

let pdce = "PDCe-HOSTNAME";
SecurityEvent
| where Computer =~ pdce
| where EventID == 4688
| where SubjectUserName endswith "$"
    or SubjectUserName =~ "SYSTEM"
| where NewProcessName has_any (
    "powershell.exe",
    "pwsh.exe",
    "cmd.exe",
    "rundll32.exe",
    "regsvr32.exe",
    "mshta.exe",
    "wscript.exe",
    "cscript.exe"
)
| project TimeGenerated, Computer, SubjectUserName,
          NewProcessName, CommandLine, ParentProcessName
| order by TimeGenerated desc

A useful investigation pattern is a service or monitoring process spawning a command interpreter, followed by directory, credential, persistence, or network activity. This is not a CVE-specific signature and will produce legitimate results in some environments. Validate the parent process, account, command line, timing, and corresponding Tenable audit event before escalating.

For organizations using Windows event forwarding, search for process-creation records with patterns such as:

Event ID: 4688
Computer: <PDCe>
SubjectUserName: SYSTEM
NewProcessName: *\cmd.exe OR *\powershell.exe
ParentProcessName: <unexpected monitoring or integration process>

Also review Event IDs 7045 and 4697 for unexpected service installation, 4698 for scheduled-task creation, and PowerShell operational logs for encoded or obfuscated commands. These events are supporting indicators, not proof that CVE-2026-106126 was exploited.

Mitigation and Patching

Tenable identifies Tenable Identity Exposure version 3.126.0 (SaaS) as the fixing version. Customers should verify that their tenant has received version 3.126.0 or a later Tenable-provided release that includes the same remediation. The supplied information does not provide an earlier affected range, so organizations should not assume that only a narrow set of versions requires review.

SaaS customers generally do not install a package on the PDCe to remediate this issue. Use the tenant’s version or service-status information if available, and open a Tenable Support case when the deployed version or rollout status cannot be confirmed. Record the confirmation, tenant identifier, date of remediation, and any required restart or connector action in the change record.

Access reviews should also cover stored credentials and privileged secrets used by integrations. Organizations formalizing that process can use this secrets management glossary as a reference when reviewing service-account exposure and credential rotation requirements.

Technical Notes

There is no customer-side upgrade command in the supplied advisory, and inventing a Tenable CLI or API endpoint would create operational risk. The actionable upgrade procedure is:

1. Confirm the tenant’s deployed release in the Tenable Identity Exposure console or service documentation.
2. Verify that the tenant reports 3.126.0 or later.
3. If the version is not visible, submit a support request stating: “Please confirm remediation of CVE-2026-106126 and the tenant’s deployed Identity Exposure version.”
4. Retest the Active Directory integration after Tenable confirms the update.

As a temporary access-control workaround, identify unnecessary accounts with access to the affected tenant and disable or remove that access. For teams reviewing access to multiple security platforms, a business-approved password manager such as Try 1Password → can help centralize credential controls, although it is not a substitute for patching or vendor confirmation.

For an on-premises Active Directory account that no longer requires access, an administrator can use the standard PowerShell cmdlet after validating the account and change approval:

Import-Module ActiveDirectory
Disable-ADAccount -Identity "<account-sAMAccountName>"

This is an account containment measure, not a vendor-confirmed fix. Do not disable service accounts blindly. Where operationally feasible, suspend nonessential low-privilege access to Tenable Identity Exposure, rotate credentials for accounts suspected of misuse, and monitor the PDCe until the SaaS remediation is confirmed.

After patch confirmation, review historical tenant audit data and PDCe telemetry for anomalous process creation, service installation, scheduled tasks, PowerShell activity, unexpected directory changes, and suspicious authentication. If evidence of command execution on the PDCe exists, isolate the host according to the organization’s domain-controller incident-response plan and investigate for credential theft or broader domain compromise.

References

Start by confirming the tenant’s deployed version and restricting unnecessary low-privilege access while that check is underway. Because the supplied records do not include the full CVSS vector, an explicit vulnerable-version range, a public exploit, or confirmed exploitation evidence, use Tenable’s advisory and tenant-specific confirmation for the remediation decision. If PDCe telemetry shows suspicious SYSTEM process creation, move directly into domain-controller incident response rather than waiting for public exploitation reporting.

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