Skip to content
eastbaycyber

CVE-2026-54228: TOCTOU Race in Red Hat abrt-dbus SetElement

CVSS · High
7.8
In CISA KEV
No
Published
Jun 13
Patch SLA & TriageVector: Local
7 days

High CVSS (7.8) vulnerability; prioritize internet-facing assets.

Exposure:
Control:
CVE explainers 9 min read
Security Research Desk Source-checked
Auto-checked against the official CVE record · Human-reviewed after publishing · Updated 2026-06-13
▲ Escalation ViewOne CVE, briefed at three altitudes — skim the Brief, weigh the Impact, or work the Runbook. The way a SOC actually reads it.
CISOBrief · 30-second brief

TL;DR - Local users can race abrt-dbus and write arbitrary text files into a root-owned dump directory. - Red Hat abrt deployments using the affected abrt-dbus path should review exposure and watch for package updates. - High severity, but no confirmed PoC or in-the-wild exploitation is publicly confirmed in the available source set.

Field Value
CVE ID CVE-2026-54228
CVSS score 7.8 (High)
Attack vector Not explicitly confirmed in available source excerpts; impact is described as local user abuse
Auth required No remote authentication path is described; practical exploitation requires local user access
Patch status Vendor issue exists, but exact fixed package version was not confirmed in the available source set

Vulnerability at a Glance

CVE-2026-54228 is a time-of-check time-of-use race condition in the abrt-dbus D-Bus service, specifically in the SetElement method. According to the NVD description, the vulnerable window exists between crash dump directory creation and post-create event execution. In that gap, a local user can invoke SetElement and write arbitrary text files into a root-owned dump directory.

The practical security issue is not merely “file write happened somewhere.” The more important point for defenders is that this write occurs inside ABRT’s crash-processing workflow and bypasses package validation. The NVD description explicitly states that this can allow crashes of unpackaged binaries to survive post-create processing, which undermines assumptions many teams make about the trustworthiness of crash artifacts and associated metadata.

What Is This Vulnerability?

ABRT, the Automatic Bug Reporting Tool, is designed to collect and process crash information in a controlled way. That control matters because crash dumps, metadata, and related files often influence later workflows such as incident analysis, support triage, telemetry, or automated post-processing. A flaw in that pipeline can become a trust-boundary problem even if it does not immediately translate into code execution.

In this case, the root cause is a TOCTOU race condition. The service appears to create a root-owned dump directory, then later proceeds with post-create event handling. The vulnerable gap lets a local user act before the expected validation and post-processing sequence fully completes. Based on the public description, the attacker can use SetElement to place arbitrary text files into that dump directory. That is enough to bypass intended validation logic and preserve crash data that should not survive normal processing.

Technical Notes

The best publicly confirmed technical summary comes from the NVD and the Red Hat Bugzilla title:

  • Vulnerable component: abrt-dbus
  • Vulnerable method: SetElement
  • Vulnerability class: TOCTOU race condition
  • Security impact confirmed by source text: arbitrary text file writes into a root-owned dump directory
  • Additional confirmed effect: bypass of package validation for unpackaged binaries

A conceptual sequence looks like this:

1. Crash handling begins
2. Root-owned dump directory is created
3. Before post-create event execution completes
4. Local user calls abrt-dbus SetElement
5. Arbitrary text file is written into the dump directory
6. Crafted crash data survives later processing
AnalystImpact · assess the risk

Who Is Affected?

The confirmed affected product is Red Hat abrt, specifically the abrt-dbus service path involving SetElement. If you run systems where ABRT is installed and enabled, especially multi-user systems where untrusted or low-trust local accounts exist, this issue belongs in your local hardening and package-review queue.

What is not confirmed from the available source excerpts is the precise affected version range or the exact fixed version number. The NVD summary does not list explicit ranges in the research note provided, and the Red Hat advisory pages referenced were not available in a form that exposed package-version detail in the source set. Because of that, it would be inaccurate to claim specific versions such as “x through y are affected” or “fixed in z” without a directly verifiable vendor advisory.

Version detail Status
Affected product abrt
Affected subcomponent abrt-dbus / SetElement
Affected version range Unknown from available source excerpts
Fixed version number Unknown from available source excerpts
Distribution mapping Not explicitly confirmed from available source excerpts

In the absence of exact version data, defenders should assume any currently deployed Red Hat-supported environment with abrt and abrt-dbus present may require review until vendor package guidance is published. That does not mean every installation is definitely vulnerable, but it is the safer operational assumption when vendor package granularity is still missing.

CVSS Score Breakdown

The reported CVSS base score is 7.8, which places the issue in the High severity range. The exact vector string was not available in the source material provided, so any detailed breakdown of each metric would be speculative. Still, the score aligns with a meaningful local attack surface issue that impacts integrity and potentially workflow trust in a root-owned context.

From the published description, the most defensible interpretation is that this is a local vulnerability with significant integrity implications. The current public text does not confirm direct remote exploitation, unauthenticated network reachability, or automatic privilege escalation to root. It also does not confirm arbitrary binary write or code execution. Security teams should therefore avoid overstating it as “instant root” while still treating it seriously on shared Linux systems, developer workstations, jump hosts, lab servers, and any environment where low-privileged local access is realistic.

Technical Notes

Known severity facts from the available source set:

CVSS base score: 7.8
Severity: High
Exact vector string: not confirmed in the available source excerpts
KEV status: false

If you need a board- or ticket-friendly summary, use this phrasing:

High-severity local race condition in crash-report handling that permits arbitrary text file writes into a root-owned dump directory and bypasses package validation.

Exploitation Status

At the time of writing, there is no confirmed in-the-wild exploitation in the available source set. The CVE is not listed in CISA KEV, which means there is no CISA-backed confirmation of active exploitation based on the data reviewed here. That is useful context, but it should not be mistaken for proof of safety. Local privilege-related issues often become relevant first in insider-threat, shared-host, CI runner, and breakout-chain scenarios rather than broad internet scanning.

There is also no public proof-of-concept confirmed in the available source set. That means defenders should avoid claims that a PoC exists unless they have independently validated newer public research after 2026-06-13. In practical terms, absence of a public PoC lowers opportunistic copy-paste exploitation risk, but it does not reduce the importance of patching or mitigation on exposed multi-user systems.

ResponderRunbook · act now

How to Detect It

Detection here is harder than with a network-facing RCE because the abuse path is local and race-dependent. You are less likely to catch it with perimeter telemetry and more likely to detect it through process creation, D-Bus activity, file creation in ABRT dump paths, and anomalous crash records involving unpackaged binaries. This is a good candidate for host-based telemetry and audit rules rather than signature-only detection.

Focus on systems where ABRT is enabled and where untrusted local users can run processes. Review crash dump directories for unusual text files, timestamps that cluster tightly around crash creation, or artifacts associated with binaries that should not have passed package validation. If your environment already centralizes auditd, journald, or EDR process/file telemetry, use that to correlate calls into ABRT-related tooling with writes under dump directories owned by root.

Technical Notes

Potential filesystem locations to review may include ABRT-managed dump paths such as:

sudo find /var/tmp/abrt -maxdepth 3 -type f -printf '%TY-%Tm-%Td %TH:%TM:%TS %u %g %p\n' 2>/dev/null | sort
sudo find /var/spool/abrt -maxdepth 3 -type f -printf '%TY-%Tm-%Td %TH:%TM:%TS %u %g %p\n' 2>/dev/null | sort

Look for suspicious ownership and timing around crash handling:

sudo ls -lR /var/tmp/abrt /var/spool/abrt 2>/dev/null
sudo journalctl -u abrtd --since "2026-06-01" | tail -n 200

A concrete auditd rule to watch for writes below common ABRT paths:

sudo auditctl -w /var/tmp/abrt -p wa -k abrt_dump_writes
sudo auditctl -w /var/spool/abrt -p wa -k abrt_dump_writes

Query those events:

sudo ausearch -k abrt_dump_writes -i

Example detection logic to investigate:

Pattern: file create/write events under /var/tmp/abrt or /var/spool/abrt
AND process user != root
AND event timestamp occurs within seconds of abrtd crash-processing activity

If you use Splunk or another log platform with auditd ingestion, a starting query could be:

index=linux_audit key=abrt_dump_writes (name="/var/tmp/abrt/*" OR name="/var/spool/abrt/*")
| stats count min(_time) max(_time) values(uid) values(exe) values(name) by host

Because public exploit telemetry is not yet established, treat this as anomaly hunting rather than high-confidence signature detection.

Mitigation and Patching

The primary remediation is to apply the vendor-provided package update once Red Hat publishes package-specific fix guidance. However, the exact fixed version number was not confirmed in the available source set, so it would be wrong to state “fixed in version X” here. Security teams should track the Red Hat CVE page and associated errata for authoritative package names and build numbers.

Until that package guidance is available, mitigation should focus on reducing local attack opportunity. If ABRT is not required on affected systems, consider disabling it temporarily after change-control review. If it is required, restrict shell access and untrusted local execution on systems running abrt-dbus. This is especially relevant for bastion hosts, academic or lab systems, shared admin boxes, and build environments where many users can execute local processes.

Technical Notes

Check whether ABRT components are installed:

rpm -qa | grep -E '^abrt|^libreport'
systemctl status abrtd abrt-journal-core abrt-oops 2>/dev/null

Refresh package metadata and check for updates:

sudo dnf check-update abrt\*
sudo dnf info abrt

When Red Hat publishes the fixed package, the likely upgrade workflow will be package-manager based. Use the exact vendor-advised NEVRA once available. Until then, the generic update command is:

sudo dnf upgrade abrt\*

If ABRT is not operationally necessary, a temporary workaround is to disable the service stack:

sudo systemctl disable --now abrtd
sudo systemctl disable --now abrt-journal-core abrt-oops 2>/dev/null

You can also reduce exposure by limiting who can log in locally and by tightening auditing around ABRT paths while awaiting a confirmed fix version. If your environment depends on crash reporting for supportability, document the temporary risk acceptance rather than silently disabling it.

References

The most authoritative references currently available for this CVE are the NVD record, the Red Hat CVE page, and the Red Hat Bugzilla issue. The Bugzilla title is particularly useful because it confirms the affected component and the arbitrary file-write angle in the dump-directory workflow. Those sources are enough to justify defensive action, even though they do not yet expose all package-version details in the research set used here.

For exact affected builds, errata, and fixed package versions, defenders should rely on Red Hat’s security advisory and package metadata as they become available. Until then, ticket this as a high-severity local hardening issue with incomplete version granularity rather than waiting for perfect data.

For more information on related vulnerabilities, check out CVE-2026-8732 and CVE-2026-47114.

This article may contain affiliate links. We earn a commission on qualifying purchases at no extra cost to you.

Choosing a tool? Pricing and head-to-head guides

Last verified: 2026-06-13

Disclaimer: This article may contain affiliate links. We earn a commission on qualifying purchases at no extra cost to you.