CVE-2026-41948: Dify Plugin Daemon Path Traversal
Critical CVSS (9.4) reachable over local.
TL;DR - CVE-2026-41948 is a critical path-traversal flaw in Dify 1.14.1 and earlier. - Authenticated users may escape tenant paths and reach internal Plugin Daemon endpoints. - No confirmed public PoC or in-the-wild exploitation was established; patch and investigate urgently.
Summary
CVE-2026-41948 is a relative path-traversal vulnerability in Dify’s request handling around the Plugin Daemon internal REST API. An authenticated attacker may manipulate task identifiers or filename parameters containing traversal sequences, causing requests to resolve outside the intended tenant-specific path. Depending on deployment configuration, this can expose internal endpoints, including debug interfaces and potentially cross-tenant data.
Internet-facing Dify instances, multi-tenant environments, and deployments that permit free self-registration face greater exposure. Dify Cloud’s unauthenticated registration path can make the authentication prerequisite comparatively easy to satisfy, although the available research does not establish that every deployment is exploitable in the same way.
For background on this vulnerability class, see our CWE-23 glossary guide.
| Field | Assessment |
|---|---|
| CVE | CVE-2026-41948 |
| Product | Dify by langgenius |
| Affected versions | 0 through and including 1.14.1 |
| CVSS base score | 9.4 |
| CVSS vector | Exact vector was not exposed in the supplied NVD result; confirm it in the NVD record before automated scoring |
| Attack vector | Reported as involving application requests to the internal Plugin Daemon API; exact CVSS AV component should be confirmed from NVD |
| Authentication | Authenticated user required, although open registration may make account acquisition easy |
| Privileges required | Not independently established from the supplied CVSS vector; treat a normal authenticated account as potentially sufficient |
| Patch available | Upstream remediation reference exists in PR #35796; fixed release version not confirmed |
| CWE | CWE-23, Relative Path Traversal |
| CISA KEV | Not listed in the lookup supplied |
| Confirmed exploitation | Not established |
A critical score does not by itself prove active exploitation. Here, tenant-boundary traversal, internal API access, and potentially open registration create a high-priority exposure even without a confirmed weaponized exploit.
Analyst’s Take: Patch Dify first where the instance is internet-facing, multi-tenant, or permits free self-registration. The research does not confirm a universal post-exploitation outcome or a fixed release version, so pair the upgrade with tenant-isolation testing and log review rather than assuming every deployment has the same impact.
Root Cause
The root cause is insufficient validation and sanitization of user-controlled path components before the application constructs or forwards requests to the Plugin Daemon. Dot-segment sequences such as .., along with manipulated filename values, can alter path resolution. If the application validates the original string rather than the canonicalized result, the final path may leave the authorized tenant directory or route.
This is a classic CWE-23 failure. A secure implementation must normalize the path, reject traversal attempts, and enforce that the resolved target remains beneath the expected tenant-specific base directory. Validation must account for alternate encodings and decoding order; filtering only literal ../ strings is insufficient if later components decode or normalize the input.
The affected logic matters because the Plugin Daemon exposes internal REST functionality. Once a request escapes its intended tenant path, an attacker may address endpoints that the original operation was not intended to reach. The supplied research specifically identifies internal and debug interfaces as possible targets, but does not establish a universal post-exploitation outcome for every Dify deployment.
Technical Notes
Conceptually, vulnerable input may resemble the following patterns:
task_id=../../internal-endpoint
filename=..%2f..%2fdebug
filename=....//....//target
These examples are detection indicators, not a confirmed exploit syntax. Reverse proxies, frameworks, and application middleware can decode or normalize paths at different stages. Defenders should inspect both raw request targets and normalized application routes where those fields are available.
Who’s Exposed
The confirmed affected range is Dify version 0 through and including 1.14.1. The affected component is the Plugin Daemon internal REST API and the request-forwarding or path-handling logic surrounding it. The supplied references do not identify a narrower affected subrange, so administrators should treat every Dify deployment at or below 1.14.1 as exposed until the installation is upgraded to a release containing the upstream fix.
This applies to self-hosted and managed deployments where the vulnerable code path is present. Risk is elevated when Dify is reachable from the public internet, when multiple tenants share an installation, or when the deployment permits self-registration. A standalone private deployment with strict network segmentation may have a smaller attack surface, but it remains within the affected version range.
The upstream issue reference is Dify pull request #35796. The supplied primary-source material does not establish the first released Dify version containing that change. Do not assume that a version newer than 1.14.1 is fixed without checking the release notes or repository history.
| Deployment condition | Exposure consideration |
|---|---|
Dify 1.14.1 or earlier |
Treat as vulnerable |
| Publicly reachable instance | Higher likelihood of attack attempts |
| Open or free self-registration | Authentication prerequisite may be easy to obtain |
| Shared multi-tenant deployment | Potential cross-tenant impact |
| Plugin Daemon or internal APIs exposed externally | Increased direct attack surface |
| Debug interfaces enabled or reachable | Increased impact if traversal succeeds |
Severity Breakdown
NVD-associated data supplied for this issue reports a CVSS base score of 9.4, placing it in the critical range. The exact CVSS vector string was not exposed in the returned record. Because the vector determines the individual metric values, the attack-vector, privileges-required, user-interaction, scope, confidentiality, integrity, and availability components should be verified directly against the NVD record before being copied into tooling or compliance reports.
The practical severity is driven by the security boundary involved. The attacker begins with an authenticated application identity but may escape the tenant-specific path that should constrain the request. Successful access to internal Plugin Daemon endpoints can expose information or functionality beyond the user’s authorization boundary. The exact confidentiality, integrity, and availability consequences depend on which internal endpoint is reached and how the target deployment is configured.
| CVSS component | Available assessment |
|---|---|
| Base score | 9.4 |
| Attack vector | Exact vector component not available in supplied record; verify in NVD |
| Attack complexity | Not established from supplied record |
| Privileges required | Authentication is required; exact CVSS metric not independently confirmed |
| User interaction | Not established from supplied record |
| Scope | Potentially crosses tenant authorization boundaries; confirm official vector |
| Confidentiality | Potential exposure of internal or cross-tenant information |
| Integrity | Depends on reachable internal endpoint and permissions |
| Availability | Depends on reachable internal endpoint and deployment behavior |
A high score should accelerate remediation, but it should not be used to infer exploitability details absent from the official vector. Security teams should preserve the distinction between confirmed facts, likely impact, and deployment-specific assumptions.
Exploitation Status
CVE-2026-41948 is not listed in the CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog according to the supplied lookup. There is no CISA-assigned KEV due date, required action, or ransomware-campaign flag for this CVE in that lookup. KEV absence is not evidence that exploitation cannot occur; it means only that CISA has not included the issue in that catalog based on the checked data.
The available material confirms public technical disclosure, a Huntr vulnerability report, a third-party advisory, and an upstream remediation pull request. It does not establish a verified public exploit repository or a confirmed weaponized proof of concept. It also does not establish confirmed in-the-wild exploitation. The current assessment is that public vulnerability details are available, no confirmed public PoC was identified in the supplied research, and active exploitation is not established.
Organizations should not treat “no confirmed exploitation” as a reason to defer patching. Attackers can independently reproduce path-traversal behavior from a technical description, and open registration may reduce the barrier to obtaining an account. Prioritize internet-facing and multi-tenant deployments ahead of isolated internal instances.
Sources
- NVD: CVE-2026-41948
- CVE Record: CVE-2026-41948
- Dify upstream pull request #35796
- Huntr vulnerability report
- VulnCheck advisory
- Zafran technical discussion
The primary references establish the affected range, severity score, vulnerability class, and upstream remediation reference. They do not establish a fixed release number, a confirmed public PoC, or confirmed in-the-wild exploitation. Until those points are verified, defenders should treat Dify 1.14.1 and earlier as vulnerable and prioritize a controlled upgrade, network restriction, and focused monitoring.
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Detection Guidance
Detection should combine web or API telemetry, identity events, and Plugin Daemon service logs. Search for traversal markers in task identifiers, filename parameters, URL paths, and decoded request fields. Relevant indicators include literal .., percent-encoded dot or slash sequences, repeated slash variants, unusual normalization artifacts, and requests that reference tenant UUIDs unrelated to the authenticated user.
A single traversal string is not proof of exploitation. Legitimate clients, scanners, or malformed requests can generate similar data. Triage should correlate the request with the account, source address, response status, target endpoint, tenant context, and any subsequent access to debug or internal APIs. Newly created accounts followed by traversal attempts deserve particular attention on installations that allow self-registration.
Technical Notes
A generic reverse-proxy query can identify common indicators. Adapt field names and parsing syntax to the logging platform:
(
request_uri contains ".."
OR request_uri contains "%2e"
OR request_uri contains "%2f"
OR request_uri contains "%5c"
OR request_uri contains "%252e"
OR request_uri contains "%252f"
)
AND (
request_uri contains "plugin"
OR request_uri contains "task"
OR request_uri contains "filename"
OR request_uri contains "debug"
)
For Splunk-style logs where the complete request target is in uri:
index=web
| eval u=lower(uri)
| where like(u,"%..%")
OR like(u,"%2e%")
OR like(u,"%2f%")
OR like(u,"%5c%")
| search u="*plugin*" OR u="*task*" OR u="*filename*" OR u="*debug*"
| stats count values(status) values(user) values(src_ip) by uri
Review application or Plugin Daemon logs for requests returning unexpected success responses after traversal-like input. Useful correlations include one account accessing multiple tenant UUIDs, access to internal debug routes, bursts of requests containing different path encodings, and account creation immediately before suspicious API activity. The supplied research does not provide a vendor-specific log message or confirmed network signature, so these queries should be treated as behavioral detections rather than exact signatures.
Remediation Steps
The affected range is Dify 0 through 1.14.1. The available evidence identifies upstream PR #35796 as the remediation reference, but it does not establish the first Dify release that includes the fix. Administrators should identify the first release containing that change in Dify’s release notes or repository history, then upgrade to that release or a later supported version. Do not report a specific fixed version until that mapping is verified.
After upgrading, restart all relevant Dify services and confirm that the running image or package, rather than merely the repository checkout, contains the remediation. In containerized environments, verify the deployed image digest and roll out every affected application and Plugin Daemon instance. Test tenant isolation and reject traversal sequences in a staging environment before production deployment.
Technical Notes
Because the exact fixed release is not established in the supplied references, an upgrade command must use an administrator-selected, verified fixed tag rather than an invented version:
# Replace FIXED_TAG with the first Dify release confirmed to include PR #35796
export DIFY_TAG="FIXED_TAG"
docker compose pull
docker compose up -d
docker compose ps
docker compose images
For a source-based deployment, verify the patch is present before rebuilding:
git fetch --tags origin
git log --all --oneline --grep='35796'
# Check out the first verified release containing the remediation:
git checkout "$DIFY_TAG"
docker compose build --pull
docker compose up -d
If immediate upgrading is impossible, apply layered mitigations:
- Restrict the Plugin Daemon internal API to the application network and deny direct internet access.
- Remove public ingress routes that expose internal or debug endpoints.
- Disable or restrict debug interfaces according to the deployment’s supported configuration.
- Review reverse-proxy normalization and decoding behavior, while recognizing that proxy filtering is not a substitute for the application fix.
- Restrict self-registration or require administrator approval for new accounts.
- Review recently created users, authentication activity, and tenant access for suspicious behavior.
- Rotate credentials, tokens, or secrets if internal endpoints or debug interfaces may have been accessed.
- Preserve relevant logs before making configuration changes, because remediation can remove evidence needed for investigation.
A practical validation test after patching is to use a nonproduction account and confirm that traversal-like inputs are rejected or safely confined to the intended tenant path. Do not test against another customer’s tenant or against production data. Confirm that direct requests to internal Plugin Daemon and debug routes are denied from untrusted networks.
For incident-response planning, see our guide to running a cybersecurity tabletop exercise.